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1 Introduction
Since Yaari (1965), the demand for annuities has become the cornerstone of the theory
of consumption under uncertain lifetime. Provided that annuities are fairly priced, it
has been shown that their demand should be relatively high to finance the last period’s
consumption. The remainder of the portfolio may then be composed of regular bonds,
which, if the Decision Maker (DM) exhibits some bequest motives, are intended for
her heirs. As shown in Davidoff et al. (2005), this result holds under quite general
specifications and is therefore at odds with most empirical studies. This is known to
be the annuity puzzle.
In most of the literature, a rather specific financial environment with no other
uncertainty than life duration is assumed. The annuity is therefore a risky asset, whose
stochastic yield is compared to a risk free interest rate. We claim, that introducing a
stochastic interest rate strongly modifies the demand for annuities, as this becomes an
instrument for portfolio diversification. The problem we consider is the following. At
each period of life, annuities provide deterministic returns if the DM is alive and zero
returns if she is dead. Conversely, bonds (or stocks) yield an uncertain return, which
is independent of their owner’s survival probability. We propose the simplest possible
model to analyze the diversification problem of a DM that faces these two types of
risk. The simplicity lies on the assumption that only the bequest yields some utility,
or equivalently, that there is no consumption in the case of survival. This eases the
comparison with the literature, since the optimal demand for annuities is zero if bond
returns are deterministic. In such a setting, a positive demand for annuities is only
due to the uncertainty of the interest rate.
We show that, in this stochastic financial environment, the demand for annuities
may be positive. Annuities are purchased to diversify the portfolio, but their demand
does not necessarily increase with the risk of bond returns. We show that a mean-
preserving spread on bond returns increases the optimal demand for annuities if the
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DM is prudent, but not too prudent. We therefore extend the initial result proposed by
Hadar and Seo (1990) to demand for annuities. Within this framework, we also study
the impact of risk aversion on the demand for annuities. We provide a sufficient condi-
tion, under which the demand for annuities is reduced when risk aversion is increased.
The condition, based only on prices, simply ensures that the optimal utility if alive is
greater than the utility if not alive. This is not true for all sets of parameters, since
the bequest yields some utility. Under that condition, a more risk adverse DM chooses
to purchase fewer annuities to reduce the gap between the utilities in the two states
of nature, life and death. This result puts into perspective the previous studies re-
sults (Blake, 1999; Friedman and Warshawsky, 1990; Milevsky, 1998; and Warshawsky,
1998) that claim that demand for annuities increases with risk aversion.
Section 2 presents the basic static framework, while the results lie in Section 3. In
Section 4, the model is extended to a dynamic setting with savings.
2 The basic framework
We consider a portfolio choice model under uncertain lifetime in which the Decision
Maker (DM) can invest in two assets to maximize her bequest utility. To focus on
the diversification issue, the problem is static and there is no utility derived from
consumption. In Section 4, this basic framework is extended to a dynamic problem
with endogenous savings.
The DM faces two independent risks: the survival and the return of one of the two
assets. The length of life is at most, two periods, but only the second one is uncertain.
Life uncertainty is characterized using the random variable x˜ which follows a Bernoulli
law whose expectancy is Ex (x˜) = p ∈ (0, 1). The bequest might therefore happen at
the end of Periods 1 and 2.
At the first period, the DM is endowed with a positive initial income ω1 that can
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be shared between bonds1 and annuities. The returns in Period 2 of bonds purchased
Period 1 are given by the random variable r˜ with support on [r−, r+], where 0 < r− ≤
r+ <∞, and whose expectancy is Er (r˜) = r¯. Bond returns are paid to the DM if alive
and to her heir if not alive. Conversely, the annuities return is r¯/p in Period 2 if the
DM is alive and nothing if she is not alive.
Following Yaari (1965), annuities returns are fair. However, we suppose that annuity
sellers can eliminate risk at no cost. It follows that annuities and bonds are two risky
assets that have the same expected return:
Ex
(
x˜
r¯
p
)
= Er (r˜) = r¯.
Conditional to survival, investments in annuities on average are more profitable
that investments in bonds. This is nevertheless not true when the realizations of r˜ are
larger than r¯/p. As a consequence, holding annuities may permit an increase in wealth
that will be bequeathed: annuities can thus be purchased even if the DM does not
derive utility from her consumption. Remark that it could be possible to extend our
framework by assuming that bonds have a higher expected return than annuities, e.g.,
due to diversification costs supported by annuity sellers. If the difference in returns is
small enough, our results are not modified.
If alive in Period 2, the DM receives a non-negative income ω2 and bequeaths her
entire wealth to her heir. Since death is certain at the end of Period 2, the bequest is
exclusively a demand for bonds. More simply, it is supposed that, between Periods 2
and 3, there is no uncertainty on bond returns, which are normalized to 1. In addition,
whatever the length of the DM’s life, bequests are received in Period 3. We denote
respectively by a and ω1 − a the demand for annuities and the demand for bonds in
Period 1. As of Period 1, the wealth that will be bequeathed in Period 3 hence satisfies:
x˜
(
r¯
p
a+ ω2
)
+ r˜ (ω1 − a) .
1For simplicity, we call the “bond” the risky asset.
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Note that there is no consumption in this basic setting, or equivalently, that con-
sumptions in Periods 1 and 2 are fixed. Then, ω1 and ω2 represent the exogenous
difference between income and consumption in each period. Note also that the case of
endogenous savings is considered in Section 4.
Due to uncertain life spans, it is not possible to borrow by selling bonds. It is also
assumed that short sale positions on annuities are not possible. Thus, the demand for
annuities and the demand for bonds are supposed to be non negative:
0 ≤ a ≤ ω1. (1)
Finally, the utility derived from the bequest is computed using the function u (.),
which is C3, satisfies u′ > 0, u′′ < 0, as well as the usual limit conditions: limy→0 u
′ (y) =
+∞ and limy→+∞ u
′ (y) = 0. The DM is an expected utility maximizer and her objec-
tive is therefore given by:
max
a
ExEr
[
u
(
x˜
(
r¯
p
a+ ω2
)
+ r˜ (ω1 − a)
)]
. (2)
The DM’s problem is to solve (2) subject to (1).
3 Annuities and portfolio diversification
This section is devoted to the analysis of the optimal portfolio. The first proposition
establishes the condition under which the DM invests in annuities. After which, the
impact of risk and risk aversion are studied.
Proposition 1 – There exists a unique optimal demand for annuities.
If ω2 = 0, the optimal demand for annuities is positive.
If ω2 > 0, the optimal demand for annuities decreases with ω2 when the DM is
prudent. Moreover, there exists ω¯2 > 0 such that the optimal portfolio is composed of
bonds and annuities, if ω2 ≤ ω¯2 and only of bonds if ω2 > ω¯2.
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Proof – As a preliminary, we define the function φ (a) as the first derivative of
(2) with respect to a, such that:
φ (a) = ExEr
[(
x˜
r¯
p
− r˜
)
u′
(
x˜
(
r¯
p
a+ ω2
)
+ r˜ (ω1 − a)
)]
. (3)
This function is well defined for a, such that, whatever the state of nature, the
realization x˜ (r¯a/p+ ω2) + r˜ (ω1 − a) is non-negative. As a result, a is lower than
the positive threshold amax = ω1 which is necessary and sufficient to guarantee the
positivity of r˜(ω1 − a). This is larger than the negative threshold amin = −(ω2 +
r−ω1)/(r¯−pr−), which is necessary and sufficient to guarantee the positivity of r¯a/p+
ω2 + r˜ (ω1 − a). Subsequently, φ(.) is well defined for a ∈ (amin, amax).
By construction of these thresholds and using the Inada conditions we have:
lim
a→amin
φ(a) = lim
̺→0
(r¯ − pr−)u
′(̺) = +∞,
lim
a→amax
φ(a) = lim
̺→0
Er[−r˜u
′(r˜̺)] = −∞.
Consequently, φ(.) has a real root aˆ ∈ (amin, amax). Since
φ′ (a) = ExEr
[(
x˜
r¯
p
− r˜
)2
u′′
(
x˜
(
r¯
p
a+ ω2
)
+ r˜ (ω1 − a)
)]
is negative, aˆ is the unique real root of φ(.).
The solution of the DM’s problem is thus denoted as a∗ and satisfies:
a∗ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
aˆ, if aˆ ≥ 0,
0 otherwise.
(4)
We now establish the positivity of aˆ, when ω2 = 0. Since u(.) is concave and
lim̺→0 u
′ (̺) = +∞, we have:
lim
a→0
φ(a)|ω2=0 = Er[(r¯ − r˜)u
′(r˜ω1)] = cov[r¯ − r˜, u
′(r˜ω1)] > 0,
lim
a→amax
φ(a)|ω2=0 = lim
̺→0
Er[−r˜u
′(r˜̺)] = −∞.
The continuity of φ(.) implies that the unique root aˆ belongs to (0, ω1) when ω2 = 0.
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When ω2 is positive, by applying the implicit function theorem to (3), we can
establish that:
daˆ
dω2
=
Er [(r¯ − pr˜) u
′′ (r¯aˆ/p+ ω2 + r˜ (ω1 − aˆ))]
−φ′ (aˆ)
.
The numerator of the RHS can now be rewritten as:
p cov
(
r¯ − r˜, u′′
(
r¯
p
aˆ+ ω2 + r˜ (ω1 − aˆ)
))
+ (1− p) r¯Er
[
u′′
(
r¯
p
aˆ+ ω2 + r˜ (ω1 − aˆ)
)]
.
This numerator is negative if u′′′ (.) > 0, or equivalently, if the DM is prudent. The
denominator is positive. Hence, the optimal demand for annuities decreases with ω2
(i.e., daˆ/dω2 < 0).
Finally, using Inada conditions, we can prove the existence of the positive threshold
ω¯2 by computing the following limit:
lim
ω2→+∞
φ (a) = − (1− p)Er [r˜u
′ (r˜ (ω1 − a))] .
Since this limit is negative, there exists, by continuity, a threshold ω¯2 above which
the optimal portfolio is only composed of bonds (i.e., a∗ = 0). 
The optimal portfolio always includes bonds, as it is the only possibility to bequeath
in case of death after the first period. The assumption of an infinite marginal utility
when the bequest goes to zero indeed ensures a positive demand for bonds.
Conversely, investing in annuities may increase the bequest value in case of survival,
but this is not necessary. Proposition 1 states that diversification using annuities arise
if ω2, the income received if alive in the second period, is low enough.
The intuition is the following. For a given realization of r˜, an increase in ω2 reduces
the marginal utility if alive. At the optimum, this is compensated by an increase in
the demand for bonds, meaning a reduction of the marginal utility if not alive. This
additional demand for bonds corresponds to a reduction in the demand for annuities.
Nevertheless, the concavity of the utility function is not sufficient to obtain our
result. Indeed, for large realizations of r˜, i.e. those which are greater than the annuities
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return r¯/p, a reduction in the demand for annuities increases the utility if alive. A
prudent behavior, as characterized by Kimball (1990), is then a sufficient condition
for this latter effect to be dominated. It indeed implies the concavity of the marginal
utility if alive with respect to r˜.
Further assumptions on the utility function permit us to derive additional results.
In the following corollary, this is notably the case, when the preferences of the DM are
homothetic. Such preferences can be represented by a homogeneous utility function,
such as the CRRA function.2
Corollary 1 – When preferences are homothetic, the demand for annuities is linearly
increasing in ω1 and linearly decreasing in ω2.
Proof – Homothetic preferences can be represented by a concave utility function
u(y) = yλ with 0 < λ < 1. According to Mas-Colell et al (1995, p. 50) this is a neces-
sary and sufficient condition for representing homothetic and continuous preferences.
Moreover, for homothetic preferences, the DM’s problem can be simplified by a change
in variable. Hence, we define k such that:
a =
kω1 − ω2
r¯/p+ k
,
with k 6= −r¯/p. Then, (3) can be rewritten as a function of k as follows:
φ
(
kω1 − ω2
r¯/p+ k
)
= ExEr
[(
x˜
r¯
p
− r˜
)
u′
(
(x˜k + r˜)
r¯ω1 + pω2
r¯ + pk
)]
.
As the function u′ (.) is homogeneous of a given degree, the real roots of φ (.) are
those of ϕ (.), where:
ϕ (k) = ExEr
[(
x˜
r¯
p
− r˜
)
u′ (x˜k + r˜)
]
. (5)
2When the indifference curves are homothetic with respect to the origin, we say that the preferences
are homothetic. Such preferences can be represented by the composition of a function homogeneous
of degree 1 with an increasing function.
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Using the Inada conditions we have:
lim
k→+∞
ϕ(k) = (1− p)Er[−r˜u
′(r˜)] < 0.
Importantly, we also have:
ϕ(0) = Er[(r¯ − r˜)u
′(r˜)] = cov[r¯ − r˜, u′(r˜)] > 0.
Concerning the derivative of ϕ(.) we find that:
ϕ′(k) = Er[(r¯ − pr˜)u
′′(k + r˜)]
= p cov (r¯ − r˜, u′′ (k + r˜)) + (1− p) r¯Er [u
′′ (k + r˜)] .
Since u
′′′
(y) = λ(λ − 1)(λ − 2)yλ−3 > 0, ϕ(.) is a decreasing function of k. As
ϕ(0) > 0, ϕ′(k) < 0 and limk→+∞ ϕ(k) < 0, the function ϕ(.) has a unique real positive
root, kˆ. Then, the optimal demand for annuities, denoted a∗, satisfies:
a∗ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
kˆω1 − ω2
r¯/p+ kˆ
, if kˆ ≥ ω2/ω1,
0 otherwise.
(6)
Since kˆ is independent of ω1 and ω2, one can conclude that a
∗ is linearly increasing
in ω1 and linearly decreasing in ω2. 
Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 reveal that the demand for annuities may be positive,
even if there is no utility derived from the consumption in Period 2. As shown in the
two following propositions, this demand can be explained by the uncertainty on bond
returns.
Proposition 2 – If the DM is prudent, the demand for annuities increases with the
survival probability.
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Proof – Suppose that the demand for annuities a∗ is positive. According to the
proof of Proposition 1, we have a∗ = aˆ. To perform comparative statics, it is useful to
rewrite (3) as follows:
φ (a) = Er
[
(r¯ − pr˜) u′
(
r¯
p
a + ω2 + r˜ (ω1 − a)
)
− (1− p) r˜u′ (r˜ (ω1 − a))
]
, (7)
which will be denoted Er[Γ(r˜)] for convenience.
From (7), and using the implicit function theorem, we have:
daˆ
dp
=
{
− Er
[
r˜
(
u′ (r˜ (ω1 − aˆ))− u
′
(
r¯
p
aˆ+ ω2 + r˜ (ω1 − aˆ)
))]
+
r¯aˆ
p2
Er
[
(r¯ − pr˜) u′′
(
r¯
p
aˆ+ ω2 + r˜ (ω1 − aˆ)
)]}/
φ′(aˆ).
The first term of the numerator is negative by the concavity of u (.), while the
second one is negative if u′′′ (.) > 0. Thus, if the DM is prudent, the numerator is
negative and we have da∗/dp > 0. 
Proposition 2 is rather intuitive. An increase in the survival probability reduces the
annuities return if alive but not its expected return, which is still equal to the return
of the bonds. However, increasing the survival probability provides more weight to
the marginal utilities if alive which is compensated by an increase in the demand for
annuities.
As in Proposition 1, the assumption of prudence is sufficient to eliminate counter-
intuitive behaviors. Moreover, the limit cases of determinisitic survival and death are
useful to understand why annuities are purchased.
In the limit case, such that p = 1, (7) becomes:
φ(a)|p=1 = cov
[
r¯ − r˜, u′(r¯a+ ω2 + r˜(ω1 − a))
]
> 0.
As the concavity of u(.) ensures its positivity, φ (.) |p=1 has no real root and the
optimal solution is a corner solution, a∗ = amax = ω1.
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In the limit case, such that p = 0, there is no annuity market and the objective
function (2) can be rewritten as: Er
[
u (r˜ (ω1 − a))
]
. In this case, the optimal solution
is a corner solution: a∗ = 0.
In both limit cases, there is by definition no annuity market, but they permit to
understand the logic behind Proposition 2. If survival is certain, the “annuity” appears
to be a standard non-risky asset whose return equals the expected return of the bonds.
Because of risk aversion, the optimal portfolio is then composed of non-risky assets
only. Conversely, if death is certain, there is no non-risky asset and all the initial
endowment are invested in bonds, whose minimal return, r−, is greater than zero.
The next proposition studies the effect of uncertainty on bond returns. To begin,
we define the relative prudence as:
RP = −
yu′′′ (y)
u′′ (y)
.
Proposition 3 – If r+ = r−, the optimal demand for annuities is zero.
If r+ > r−, a mean-preserving spread on bond returns increases the optimal demand
for annuities if the relative prudence is positive and less than 2.
Proof – When there is no risk on bond returns, equation (3) can be rewritten as:
φ (a)|r˜=r¯ = (1− p) r¯
[
u′
(
r¯
p
a+ ω2 + r¯ (ω1 − a)
)
− u′ (r¯ (ω1 − a))
]
.
The unique root of φ (.) |r˜=r¯, aˆ = −pω2/r¯, is non-positive and, according to (4), the
optimal solution is then a∗ = 0.
Suppose now that aˆ > 0. Consider a mean-preserving spread on r˜. Following Roth-
schild and Stiglitz (1971) and using (7), it increases aˆ if Γ(r˜) is convex. Differentiating
twice Γ(.) and rearranging the equation yields:
Γ′′(r˜) = −2 (ω1 − a)Ex
[
u′′
(
x˜
(
r¯
p
a+ ω2
)
+ r˜ (ω1 − a)
)]
− (ω1 − a)Ex
[(
x˜
(
r¯
p
a+ ω2
)
+ r˜ (ω1 − a)
)
u′′′
(
x˜
(
r¯
p
a + ω2
)
+ r˜ (ω1 − a)
)]
+ (ω1 − a) (ω1r¯ + pω2) u
′′′
(
r¯
p
a+ ω2 + r˜ (ω1 − a)
)
.
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Conclude that Γ(r˜) is convex when, for all y > 0, u′′′ (y) ≥ 0 and RP ≤ 2. 
Whatever the uncertainty of the length of life, there is no demand for annuities if
there is no risk on bond returns. In this case, the optimal behavior simply aims at
equalizing the utilities in the two states of nature: life and death. Since there is no
consumption if alive, the optimal demand for annuities is zero. Uncertainty on bond
returns is, in this framework, a necessary condition for annuitization. This motive
complements the one traditionally studied in the annuity literature, which relies on
consumption.
The impact of a change in risk on the demand for annuities was also discussed in
Proposition 3. As bonds become more risky, the DM optimally diversifies her portfolio
by increasing the share of annuities. To obtain such a behavior, sufficient conditions on
preferences are exhibited. The DM has to be prudent, but not relatively too prudent,
with a benchmark value at 2. This result is similar to Hadar and Seo (1990) who
studied an optimal portfolio problem with two risky assets. It is also generalized in
Gollier (2001). Interestingly, Eeckhoudt et al. (2007) proposed an interpretation of the
benchmark value in terms of preferences for disaggregating harms.
Finally, note that the conditions exhibited in Proposition 3 are satisfied if the
relative risk aversion is both lower than one and non-decreasing. The following example
reveals that the demand for annuities may decrease with the risk on bonds if the relative
risk aversion is greater than one.
Assume that the random variable r˜ has only two realizations: r+ ≡ r¯ + ε/q with
probability q and r− ≡ r¯ − ε/ (1− q) with probability 1− q. Hence, r¯ is the expected
return and ε ≥ 0 is a mean-preserving spread measure. Assume that the utility function
is CRRA: u (y) = y1−α/ (1− α), where α > 0 stands for the relative risk aversion
coefficient. As u(.) is homothetic, the optimal demand for annuities a∗ is defined by
(6) where kˆ is given by (5) (see Corollary 1).
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Obviously we have da∗/dε = da∗/dkˆ × dkˆ/dε. Since the first term of the RHS is
positive for all a∗ > 0, the sign of the effect of an increase in risk on the demand for
annuities can be evaluated with dkˆ/dε. According to (5):
dkˆ
dε
= −
ϕ′ε
ϕ′k
=
{
Ex
[
u′ (x˜k + r+)−
(
x˜
r¯
p
− r+
)
u′′ (x˜k + r+)
]
−Ex
[
u′ (x˜k + r−)−
(
x˜
r¯
p
− r−
)
u′′ (x˜k + r−)
]}/
Er
[
(r¯ − pr˜)u′′(k + r˜)
]
.
If the individual is prudent and exhibits a relative risk aversion greater than one,
the demand for annuities increases with the realization of r˜. The effect of a larger r+
is then the opposite of the effect of a larger r−. If relative prudence is strong enough,
it is not clear which effect dominates.
This is illustrated in Figure 1, which plots a∗ as a function of ε for the following
parameter values: α = 4, p = 0.9, q = 0.8, r¯ = 1.5, ω1 = 1 and ω2 = 0. Figure 1
shows that the demand for annuities is reduced by an increase in risk when the mean-
preserving spread is sufficiently high. This example has been computed for a relative
risk aversion of 4, which is standard. Nevertheless, it is a crucial parameter.
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Figure 1
In Figure 2, a∗ as a function of ε is plotted for various values of α.
The impact of risk aversion on the demand for annuities will be discussed in Propo-
sition 4.
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Proposition 4 – If ω2/ω1 ≥ r+ − r−, the demand for annuities reduces with risk
aversion.
Proof – Consider two DMs, namely A and B. We assume that the utility func-
tion of A is uA(.), whereas the utility function of B is uB (.) ≡ T ◦ uA (.) where
T (.) is an increasing and concave function. In this case, the DM B is more risk
averse than the DM A.3 Each DM i (i = A,B) maximizes their expected utility
ExEr[u
i (x˜ (r¯a/p + ω2) + r˜ (ω1 − a))] subject to (1). We denote by a
i
⋆ (i = A,B) their
optimal choices, which are the real roots of φi (a) if this latter is positive, or zero
otherwise. One has:
φi (a) = ExEr
[(
x˜
r¯
p
− r˜
)
ui ′
(
x˜
(
r¯
p
a+ ω2
)
+ r˜ (ω1 − a)
)]
.
Assume that aA⋆ and a
B
⋆ are both positive. We now exhibit a condition such that
φB
(
aA⋆
)
< 0. Such a condition implies that aB⋆ < a
A
⋆ because φ
B (.) is a decreasing
function satisfying φB
(
aB⋆
)
= 0.
Observe first that φB
(
aA⋆
)
can be rewritten as follows:
φB
(
aA⋆
)
= Er
[
T ′
(
uA
(
r¯
p
aA⋆ + ω2 + r˜
(
ω1 − a
A
⋆
)))
ψA1 (r˜)
]
−Er
[
T ′
(
uA (r˜ (ω1 − a))
)
ψA2 (r˜)
]
,
3This result was stated in Pratt (1988) who showed that concavity is preserved under mixture of
independent risks (see also Finkelshtain et al (1999)).
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where:
ψA1 (r˜) = (r¯ − pr˜)u
A ′
(
r¯aA⋆ /p+ ω2 + r˜
(
ω1 − a
A
⋆
))
,
ψA2 (r˜) = (1− p) r˜u
A ′
(
r˜
(
ω1 − a
A
⋆
))
.
As ψA2 (r˜) is positive we have:
φB
(
aA⋆
)
< Er
[
T ′
(
uA
(
r¯
p
aA⋆ + ω2 + r˜
(
ω1 − a
A
⋆
)))
ψA1 (r˜)
]
−T ′
(
uA (r+ (ω1 − a))
)
Er[ψ
A
2 (r˜)]. (8)
Importantly, φA(aA⋆ ) = 0 implies that:
Er(ψ
A
1 (r˜)|r˜ < r¯/p) Pr(r˜ < r¯/p) = Erψ
A
2 (r˜)− Er(ψ
A
1 (r˜)|r˜ ≥ r¯/p) Pr(r˜ ≥ r¯/p).
Moreover, the concavity of T (.) implies thatEr[T
′(uA(r¯aA⋆ /p+ω2+r˜(ω1−a
A
⋆ )))ψ
A
1 (r˜)]
is lower than:
T ′(uA(r−a
A
⋆ /p+ ω2 + r−(ω1 − a
A
⋆ )))Er[ψ
A
1 (r˜)|r˜ < r¯/p] Pr(r˜ < r¯/p)
+T ′(uA(r+a
A
⋆ /p+ ω2 + r+(ω1 − a
A
⋆ )))Er[ψ
A
1 (r˜)|r˜ ≥ r¯/p] Pr(r˜ ≥ r¯/p).
Then, according to (8), we have:
φB
(
aA⋆
)
<
[
T ′
(
uA
(
r¯
p
aA⋆ + ω2 + r−
(
ω1 − a
A
⋆
)))
− T ′
(
uA
(
r+
(
ω1 − a
A
⋆
)))]
Er
[
ψA2 (r˜)
]
+
[
T ′
(
uA
(
r¯
p
aA⋆ + ω2 + r+
(
ω1 − a
A
⋆
)))
− T ′
(
uA
(
r¯
p
aA⋆ + ω2 + r−
(
ω1 − a
A
⋆
)))]
×Er
[
ψA1 (r˜)
∣∣ r˜ ≥ r¯/p]Pr (r˜ ≥ r¯/p) .
Since T (.) is concave, the second term of the RHS of this inequality is negative. A
sufficient condition for φB(aA⋆ ) < 0 is therefore:
T ′
(
uA
(
r¯
p
aA⋆ + ω2 + r−
(
ω1 − a
A
⋆
)))
< T ′
(
uA
(
r+
(
ω1 − a
A
⋆
)))
,
which can be rewritten as:
r¯
p
aA⋆ + ω2 − (r+ − r−)
(
ω1 − a
A
⋆
)
> 0.
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Since the RHS of this inequality is increasing with aA⋆ , condition ω2 ≥ (r+ − r−)ω1
is sufficient. 
Proposition 4 states that more risk aversion may increase the optimal share of the
portfolio invested in bonds. The sufficient condition given only relies on parameters
and is therefore true for any increasing and concave utility function.
The condition is simply that the endowment growth factor should not be lower
than the support of the distribution of the interest factor. Were bonds supposed to be
riskless, the condition would be satisfied. More precisely, this condition ensures that,
when computed at the optimal point, the utility if alive in Period 2 is always greater
than the utility if not alive. And consequently, living with the lowest possible interest
rate bears more utility than being dead with the highest bond returns. Note that this
is not necessarily the case since it is the bequest which yields some utility.
If our condition is satisfied, more risk aversion induces to reduce the difference in
utility for each realization of r˜. A more risk adverse DM therefore lowers her demand
for annuities, which increases the utility if dead and decreases the utility if alive. Note
finally that our condition is sufficient and, as shown in the following example, that a
positive income in Period 2 is not necessary.
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Figure 3
We now consider the example used previously and plot the demand for annuities
a∗ as a function of the relative risk aversion coefficient α, for the following parameter
15
values: p = 0.9, q = 0.8, r¯ = 1.5, ω1 = 1, ω2 = 0, and an interest rate spread of ε = 0.1.
Despite the assumption of ω2 = 0, the demand for annuities typically monotonically
decreases with relative risk aversion. However, this is not always true. For instance,
by reducing the interest rate spread, the relationship may be reversed for some value
of α.
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As shown in Proposition 3, a reduction of the spread εmay indeed lower the demand
for annuities, and therefore imply, for some realizations of r˜, that the utility if not alive
is higher than the utility if alive. As shown in Figure 4, the relationship between the
demand for annuities and the risk aversion may become positive (case where ε = 0.05).
4 Extension to savings
This section introduces a dynamic behavior allowing for a first period consumption.
The assumption of no consumption if alive in the second period (or, equivalently, of
a fixed consumption) is kept to show that the demand for annuities is still positive,
provided that bond returns are risky.
The framework is the one described Section 2 extended to a first period consump-
tion. Before the lotteries, the DM may allocate her initial income ω1 > 0 between
consumption and savings, which are respectively denoted ω1 − s and s. The utility
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derived from consumption is described by the function v (.) that satisfies the same
assumptions as those of function u (.). The DM’s program can now be rewritten as:
max
s,a
{
v (ω1 − s) + ExEr
[
u
(
x˜
(
r¯
p
a + ω2
)
+ r˜ (s− a)
)]}
(9)
subject to 0 ≤ s ≤ ω1 and 0 ≤ a ≤ s.
Proposition 5 – If r+ = r−, there exists a unique optimum (s
∗, a∗) where s∗ ∈ (0, ω1)
and a∗ = 0. If r+ > r−, there exists ωˆ2 > 0 such that if the DM is prudent and if
ω2 < ωˆ2, there exists a unique optimum (s
∗, a∗) ∈ (0, ω1)
2
.
Proof – First, we establish the existence and uniqueness of the optimum (s∗, a∗),
when the bond return is random. The first order conditions of problem (9) are:
−v′ (ω1 − s
∗) + ExEr
[
r˜u′
(
x˜
(
r¯
p
a∗ + ω2
)
+ r˜ (s∗ − a∗)
)]
= 0, (10)
ExEr
[(
x˜
r¯
p
− r˜
)
u′
(
x˜
(
r¯
p
a∗ + ω2
)
+ r˜ (s∗ − a∗)
)]
= 0. (11)
From (10), we can define the following function ξa(s):
ξa(s) = −v
′ (ω1 − s) + ExEr
[
r˜u′
(
x˜
(
r¯
p
a+ ω2
)
+ r˜ (s− a)
)]
.
The function ξa(.) is well defined for all s, such that x˜ (r¯a/p + ω2) + r˜ (s− a) is
non-negative. ξa(.) is well defined for s ∈ (a, ω1) and using the Inada conditions:
lim
s→a
ξa(s) = lim
̺→0
(1− p)Er[r˜u
′(r˜̺)] = +∞,
lim
s→ω1
ξa(s) = lim
̺→0
−v′(̺) = −∞.
As a result, ξa(.) has at least one root s
∗ that belongs to (a, ω1). According to
Proposition 1, it is straightforward that for any root s∗, there exists a positive threshold
ωˆ2 such that (11) has one real root a
∗ that belongs to (0, s∗), if ω2 < ωˆ2.
To prove the uniqueness of the pair (s∗, a∗), we first combine (10) and (11) to obtain:
γ(s∗, a∗) = −v′ (ω1 − s
∗) + r¯Er
[
u′
(
r¯
p
a∗ + ω2 + r˜ (s
∗ − a∗)
)]
= 0.
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From γ(s∗, a∗) = 0, we can use the implicit function theorem to define a continuous
application a∗ = η (s∗) where:
η′ (s∗) = −
γ′s(s
∗, a∗)
γ′a(s
∗, a∗)
= −
v′′ (ω1 − s
∗) + r¯Er [r˜u
′′ (r¯a∗/p+ ω2 + r˜ (s
∗ − a∗))]
r¯Er [(r¯ − pr˜)u′′ (r¯a∗/p+ ω2 + r˜ (s∗ − a∗))] /p
, (12)
As γ′a(.) = r¯ cov[r¯− r˜, u
′′(r¯a∗/p+ω2+ r˜(ω1−a
∗))]+ (1/p−1)r¯2Er
[
u′′(r¯a∗/p+ω2+
r˜(ω1− a
∗))
]
, the denominator of (12) is negative when u′′′ (.) > 0. Since γ′s(.) < 0, η(.)
is a decreasing function when the DM is prudent.
Now, replacing η (s) in (10), we can define the function ξ (s) as follows:
ξ (s) = ξη(s)(s) = −v
′ (ω1 − s) + ExEr
[
r˜u′
(
x˜
(
r¯
p
η (s) + ω2
)
+ r˜
(
s− η(s)
))]
.
We have:
ξ′ (s) = v′′ (ω1 − s) + ExEr
[
r˜2u′′
((
x˜
r¯
p
− r˜
)
η (s) + x˜ω2 + r˜s
)]
+η′ (s)ExEr
[
r˜
(
x˜
r¯
p
− r˜
)
u′′
((
x˜
r¯
p
− r˜
)
η (s) + x˜ω2 + r˜s
)]
.
Next, a sufficient condition for ξ′ (s) < 0 is:
−η′(s)Er[r˜(r¯ − pr˜)u
′′(z)] > v′′(ω1 − s) + pEr[r˜
2u′′(z)],
or, equivalently, using (12):
Er [r˜ (r¯ − pr˜)u
′′ (z)]
r¯Er [(r¯ − pr˜) u′′ (z)] /p
<
v′′ (ω1 − s) + pEr [r˜
2u′′ (z)]
v′′ (ω1 − s) + r¯Er [r˜u′′ (z)]
,
where z = r¯η/p+ ω2 + r˜ (s− η).
The condition can be rewritten as:
−
1
p
v′′(ω1 − s)Er[(r¯/p− r˜)
2u′′(z)] < (r¯/p)2{Er[r˜
2u′′(z)]Er[u
′′(z)]− (Er[r˜u
′′(z)])2}.
According to the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality, the RHS of this inequality is positive.
Subsequently, the condition is satisfied and ξ′(s) < 0. Consequently, ξ(s) has at most
one real root s∗ and the pair (s∗, a∗) is unique.
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Finally, we focus on the riskless case. When there is no risk of bond returns (i.e.
for r˜ = r¯), (11) can be rewritten as follows:
(1− p)
[
u′
(
r¯
p
a+ ω2 + r¯(s− a)
)
− u′
(
r¯(s− a)
)]
= 0.
Then, one may explicitly compute the solution, aˆ = −pω2/r¯, which is negative.
The optimal demand for annuities is therefore: a∗ = 0. 
Proposition 5 shows that the results contained in Propositions 1 and 3 still hold
when a saving motive is introduced. The following numerical simulations also show
that, as claimed in Proposition 4, the demand for annuities may still decrease with risk
aversion.
We extend the basic example studied in Section 3 with the following utility function
for the first period consumption: v (y) = y0.6/0.6. Using the parameter values of Figure
3, Figure 5 plots the demand for annuities a∗ and the savings as functions of the relative
risk aversion coefficient α.
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Figure 5
The demand for annuities still monotonically decreases with relative risk aversion,
despite an increase in saving.
However, considering a lower spread ε (0.05 rather than 0.1) is sufficient to obtain
a non-monotonic relationship. Figure 6 plots the demand for annuities a∗ and the
savings as functions of the relative risk aversion coefficient α, with a lower spread.
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5 Conclusions
In this article, we have studied the demand for annuities when the alternative asset
has a risky return. We have provided conditions under which the demand for annuities
increases with the financial risk and reduces with risk aversion. An important assump-
tion of this work is the DM’s perfect knowledge of the probability distributions. It
would be interesting to instead suppose some ambiguity in the probabilities and study
the DM’s attitude when facing those two different sources of uncertainty.
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